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Abstract.  Studies  on  trust  in  information  sources  have  mostly  focused  on 
whether the source is capable of providing  correct and  complete information, 
thus overlooking another essential aspect of trust: the assessment of relevance. 
Information, even when true, is literally useless, unless it relates meaningfully 
to the informational needs and practical goals of its recipient. Moreover, relev-
ance, exactly like truth, is not a self-evident feature of information: agents fre-
quently realize whether or not an information was relevant for their purposes  
only ex post, and this is precisely why relevance, like truth, requires trust. The 
agent needs to be able to (i) rely on the relevance of the information provided  
by a source before or without being able to directly verify such relevance, and  
thus (ii) estimate the quality of sources also based on their ability to consistently 
deliver relevant (as well as correct and complete) information. In this paper we  
outline some desiderata for modeling relevance as one of the key features in de-
ciding whether to trust an information source, we analyze its related role in de-
termining belief formation and change, we detail how to assess relevance in or-
der  to  avoid  biases  (e.g.,  giving  systematic  priority  to  good  news  over  bad 
ones), we discuss whether relevance is a subjective or an objective feature of in-
formation (and in what sense), and we conclude by suggesting possible ways of 
implementing and/or formalizing trust in relevance for MAS, based on previous 
work on trust dynamics.
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1. Introduction
Imagine asking a trusted friend to suggest some fancy recipe for a dinner, only to be 
answered as follows: “Today the weather in Bali is perfect for a day at the beach”. Let  
us stipulate that the weather today is indeed splendid in Bali, and that such informa-
tion covers all that there is to know about weather conditions there, as far as beach ex-
peditions are concerned. So your friend cannot be faulted for being incorrect or reti-
cent. Yet, you would certainly be disappointed by that answer, and rightly so. In fact, 
you have just been provided with an information that is not only unrelated to your ac-
tual query, but also useless with respect to any of your pragmatic concerns – assuming 
going to the beach in Bali today is not a feasible option for you, alas! In a nutshell, the 
problem with that answer is lack of relevance. This is crucial to determine the inform-
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ational quality of the message, and thus, in retrospection, the overall trustworthiness 
of its source. In our example, in the absence of some mitigating circumstances (e.g., 
your friend failed to hear or misunderstood the question), such an irrelevant remark 
will backfire on the source, giving you reason to be less inclined to rely on your friend 
for advice in the future.
All of this is self-evident, and thus one would expect to find a substantial body of 
work on the role of relevance for trust. However, this is not the case: on the contrary, 
almost all  existing theories  and models of  trust  focus on correctness  (if  source  X 
provides information p, p is true) and completeness (if p is true, source X provides in-
formation p) as indicators of source performance, without addressing the problem of 
relevance. While these factors have often been further analyzed in detail, e.g. distin-
guishing whether the source is mistaken or reticent due to ignorance (incompetence) 
or malice (insincerity), similar distinctions have not been raised with respect to relev-
ance. This omission is striking, because there is no doubt that an information is valu-
able only if it is also relevant, in addition to correct and complete.1
Lack of interest for relevance would be partially justified if this was a self-mani-
festing feature of information: that is, if the relevance of a message was always imme-
diately obvious to its  receiver,  without  doubt or  error.  If  that  was the case,  there 
would be nothing to trust or distrust regarding relevance of information, because there 
would be no knowledge gap and thus no need to rely on someone or something to 
bridge it: relevance, or lack thereof, would simply be known as soon as a proposition 
is uttered.  Agents  would still  have to trust  sources  for being relevant,  in order  to 
choose which one to consult before being able to directly assess the relevance of their 
information. But relevance would not be a matter of trust with respect to information.
However, the relevance of an information is not so easy to ascertain – although it 
might be argued that it is more accessible than truth in most cases. We typically con-
sult sources more knowledgeable than ourselves on the matter at hand, and their su-
perior knowledge often includes also understanding what is important (for us) better 
than we do ourselves. This is certainly true for all sources in a tutorial position with 
respect  to the receiver (e.g., parents, teachers,  advisers, physicians), and it is often 
true also for sources in general. Besides, the most spectacular example of the need for  
trust in relevance is provided by information retrieval technologies. When we search 
something on Google, we never scan more than a tiny fraction of the available results, 
and we regularly give more weight to those highly ranked by the search engine – 
which  uses,  in  fact,  a  relevance  algorithm.  A recent  experimental  study with eye 
tracking techniques (Pan et al. 2007) revealed that college students have substantial 
trust  in  the  relevance  of  highly  ranked  Google  results,  even  when  the  abstracts  
provided for these entries were less relevant to their query – that is, they confided in 
Google to know better than themselves what would satisfy their interests. More gener-
1 Indeed, relevance, like correctness, is  always essential to guarantee the quality of informa-
tion for a receiver, whereas completeness matters only under certain conditions, e.g. an ut -
most need for precision and exhaustiveness. Moreover, it is plain that relevance is needed to  
provide an interesting characterization of completeness: in fact, for an information source 
“being thorough” does not mean randomly mentioning true information, but rather providing 
all the true information that matters with respect to the speaker's interests – that is, all true  
relevant information.
ally, the need for this kind of trust in relevance should be obvious in any informa-
tion-intense environment.
Even if trust theory has largely neglected relevance, this notion has received sub-
stantial scrutiny in other areas: information theory has not provided any comprehens-
ive account of relevance, as often lamented in the literature (e.g, Bremer & Cohnitz 
2004; Floridi 2004, 2008), but specific approaches to communication have focused 
extensively on it – most notably, in information retrieval (e.g., Cooper 1971; Crestani 
et al. 1998; Borlund 2003), where relevance is analyzed as an answer to a (possibly 
underspecified) query,  and in pragmatics (e.g.,  Sperber & Wilson 1995; Wilson & 
Sperber 2004; Borg 2005), where relevance is defined in terms of how much an utter-
ance contributes to the ongoing dialogical interaction. It is beyond the purpose of this 
paper to provide a comprehensive review of the vast literature on relevance (but see 
Floridi 2008 for a brief and highly informative summary, and Cohen 1994 for more 
extensive discussion): suffice it to say that the problem of trust has never been central  
in these areas either.
So it seems we have unexplored ground to cover ahead of us. To try and make the 
best of it, we will proceed as follows: section 2 will detail our definition of relevance,  
contrast it with how this notion is interpreted in information theory and pragmatics,  
and address the related but different problem of relevance assessment, to wit, how to 
compute the relevance of an information; section 3 will explain why relevance is not 
to be confused with (or reduced to) the utility of an information, to avoid biasing 
agents towards good news, and because there are features of information that, albeit 
unrelated with relevance, still impact on its usefulness (e.g., indispensability); section 
4 will argue that relevance can be either subjective or objective, depending on wheth-
er it is assessed in relation to the agent's goals (what we want) or to some objective in-
terest (what we truly need), to show that this distinction plays an important role in 
modeling agents dynamics; section 5 will provide some suggestions on how to form-
alize and implement trust in relevance for multi-agent systems, given all the features 
highlighted in the rest of the paper and building on previous work in trust dynamics.
2. What relevance is, and how to assess it
It is fairly obvious that relevance is relative to some goal in general sense, e.g. a need,  
a desire, an intention, an objective, a concern, a passion, a task, and similar. Thus it  
would seem equally plain that only a grounded, systematic, and analytic theory of 
(implicit and explicit) goals can provide the basis for a theory of relevance. However, 
existing models of relevance endured significant pains to avoid any explicit reference 
to goals in their definition of relevance: this is true not only of pragmatics approaches 
(e.g., Sperber and Wilson notoriously define relevance as maximization of the ratio 
between benefits and costs in communication), but also of epistemological analysis of 
relevance. For instance, Floridi defends «a subjectivist interpretation of epistemic rel-
evance […] based on a counterfactual and metatheoretical analysis of the degree of 
relevance of some semantic information i to an informee/agent a, as a function of the 
accuracy of i understood as an answer to a query q, given the probability that q might 
be asked by a» (2008, p. 69). While his approach has many merits, its considerable 
complexity mostly stems from the self-imposed restriction of not mentioning goals in 
the definition of relevance, which forces him to resort to convoluted notions such as 
(roughly) “how good would I have considered this information as an answer to my 
query, given the probability that I had posed the query if I had been aware there was 
something valuable to be known”. Whether or not one agrees with this analysis, it is 
worth wondering whether it would not be much simpler to define relevance in terms 
of goals, especially since goals seem to be lurking behind these definitions anyway – 
benefits obviously depend on goals (and the same is true for some costs, e.g. oppor-
tunity costs), and something is valuable to know only if it bears on the agent's goals.
Current theories of relevance are “shy about goals” for a simple reason, though: 
they lack a principled theory to connect goals to information. In the absence of that 
theory, stating that “relevance depends on goals” would of course be moot, because 
we would not know how to specify such dependence in ways that make relevance as -
sessment tractable.  Luckily,  such a theory is available: goal-processing, that is, the 
cognitive process that turns a desire into a full-blown intention (Bratman 1987), has 
been analyzed as being based on beliefs (Castelfranchi & Paglieri 2007), which in 
turn are information that the agent considers credible enough to warrant acting upon 
(Paglieri 2004). So it is possible to define an information as relevant for a goal if and  
only if it is a candidate for a belief that supports the processing of that goal  – and the 
set of goal-supporting beliefs is neither infinite, nor vague, nor context-dependent.
While full details of belief-based goal-processing are provided elsewhere (Castel-
franchi & Paglieri 2007), here it suffices to mention all the possible uses that an in-
formation can have for the processing of a goal:
- activating the right goal in the right circumstances; 
- evaluating whether the goal is already realized, self-realizing, or impossible;
- understanding that the goal depends on us, so we have to decide and act; 
- detecting conflicts between active goals and thus prompting to choose; 
- choosing between goals based on pros and cons;
- formulating/selecting a plan for the chosen goal, given “know how” and skills;
- performing the chosen action on the basis of the assumed enabling conditions;
- knowing that the goal has been realized and thus stop (or try again, or drop it), 
and then be satisfied or frustrated;
- understanding the reasons of the outcome (be it success or failure) and thus learn.
If (and to the extent that) an information satisfies one of these tests and steps in  
goal-processing, then it is relevant. So relevant means ‘usable’ for a given goal and its 
processing  (but  not  necessarily  ‘useful’,  see  later).  However,  while  the  notion  of 
‘use’ refers to all possible means and tools that are instrumental to or favorable for a 
certain outcome, ‘relevant’ mainly focuses on the epistemic dimension: on informa-
tion as an instrumental good. ‘Relevant’ means ‘useful to know, to be considered, to 
be taken into account’ (not necessarily in a propositional or even in a conscious way). 
In  other  words,  relevance  captures  the  evaluative  dimension  of  information  and  
knowledge (Miceli & Castelfranchi 1989). Considering information in terms of its rel-
evance implies evaluating it (explicitly or implicitly), assigning it some “value” that 
can only be derived from goals. This evaluation can be explicit, or consist of an impli-
cit precedence given to relevant information by the design of the system, or even be 
an affective and intuitive ‘attraction’ for certain information (Castelfranchi 2000). It 
can be based also on theories about what constitutes useful information, and it can be 
modulated by different ‘standards’ or levels of abstract knowledge characteristic of a 
given context (Floridi 2008).
A crucial consequence of defining relevance in relation to goals is that it vindicates 
the following intuition on source assessment: in order to be considered of high qual -
ity, a source must not simply provide appropriate answers to my queries, but also pro-
actively offer relevant information that were never asked, and yet happens to be im-
portant for me. A good source is over-helping (Falcone & Castelfranchi 2001), which 
in this context means over-answering: providing more information than those initially 
required, or even in the absence of any explicit query.  Over-answering is typically 
meant to provide relevant information beyond what was explicitly requested, possibly 
because the original query is considered by the source as irrelevant for the agent's real  
needs (see also section 4).2 The source (i) recognizes a need for knowledge as a means 
to some end (or better ascribes you such goals, and bets on that), and (ii) decides to 
collaborate with your end, by providing you the necessary or useful information.
Imagine a tourist in Rome asking at the train station: “How much is a ticket to 
Naples?”. The lady at the ticket counter replies: “It's 10 euros. But they have changed 
the platform for the next train; it leaves from platform 16 now. You have to hurry, it  
leaves in 5 minutes”. Here the source is not only providing the required information, 
but also informing the agent of many other facts that she deems important for his (im-
plicit and inferred) goal of “speedily going to Naples by train”. Crucially, the source 
would not be considered as being  really helpful if she just offered the  required in-
formation, and failed to offer all the other relevant information she knew – even if the 
tourist did not or could not ask for it. In fact, what is explicitly requested may even be  
irrelevant, as when the tourist (intending to travel today to Naples) asks “Where I can 
find a train schedule?”, and the answer is “Today the railway personnel is on strike, so 
there are no trains leaving from this station”. And of course the source could also be 
wrong in ascribing a goal to the agent, thus (unintentionally) providing irrelevant in-
formation by over-answering: for instance, if in the previous example the tourist had 
the goal of leaving the day after tomorrow instead of today, being informed of the on-
going strike would be useless, in spite of the best intentions of the source.
3. Relevance is not utility
In light of the close relationship between goals and relevance, it is tempting to think 
of the latter as a measure of the utility of information, loosely understood as the capa-
city of that information to foster the agent's goals. In this view, the more an informa-
tion promotes the agent's current agenda, the greater its relevance for that agent. This 
intuition is certainly appealing, but ultimately misleading, for two different reasons.
Firstly, equating relevance with the utility of information could make agents ex-
ceedingly biased in relevance assessment towards “good news”, that is, information 
that agree with the agent's plans and concerns. For instance, given the goal of “hiking 
tomorrow”, the information “tomorrow will rain” is certainly disappointing for the 
2 This  applies  only  to  benevolent  sources:  a  malicious  source  could  of  course  use  over-
answering as a strategy to muddle the issue and mislead the other agent. However, we spec-
ulate that in human society cooperative over-answering is much more frequent than its mali-
cious counterpart, and that people count on it and assess sources also based on it.
agent, in that it pressures to revise or even abandon the original goal; in contrast, the 
information “tomorrow will be sunny” is definitely pleasing. Intuition tells us that 
both information are equally relevant, and yet defining relevance in terms of “goal ad-
vancement” would make good news systematically more relevant than bad news.
This bias  is  not  only hard to  justify on epistemic grounds,  but  also potentially 
harmful for the agent's ability to gather valid information, depending on how relev-
ance interacts with the assessment of other features of information, e.g. its correct-
ness. Imagine relevance determines the order in which information is processed: the 
more relevant an information is, the sooner its credibility is assessed by the agent.  
Imagine further that information assessment follows some sort of satisficing proced-
ure, à la Simon (1956): as soon as a candidate information is deemed good enough to 
warrant belief, no further candidates are considered. These assumptions are in fact 
very plausible for real-life agents in most situations: now it is easy to see that, in this 
case, assigning higher relevance to good news can make the agent believe in a posit-
ive information, even when there is stronger evidence for a conflicting, less pleasant 
option – if only one would deign to pay attention to it. Moreover, the bias towards 
good news would also contaminate the informational ecology where agents live: as-
suming sources are competing for attention (again, a relatively safe assumption), there 
would be a strong pressure to communicate only positive information, while passing 
under silence any bad news. Ultimately this would make not only the individual, but 
also the whole population blind to a host of relevant (albeit unpleasant) facts. Not to 
mention the extreme vulnerability to malicious sources, that could use flattery to gain 
the trust of others and than exploit it for their personal interest.
Defenders of utility-based relevance could reply that all these problems arise from 
a  misguided  definition  of  information  utility.  An  information  should  not  be  con-
sidered useful because it is pleasant (that is, it makes me believe to progress towards 
my goals), but rather because it  fosters goal achievement as a matter of fact. Given 
the goal of “hiking tomorrow”, the relevance of the information “tomorrow will be 
sunny” hinges on whether or not tomorrow will indeed turn out to be a sunny day, re-
gardless of how happy I am today to believe that piece of information. As for bad 
news, e.g. “tomorrow will rain”, their utility should be assessed by considering what 
negative consequences they help averting, again assuming they turn out to be correct:  
even if I am not particularly happy of being told today that tomorrow will rain, thus 
spoiling my hopes for a beautiful hike, this is still good to know, if the alternative 
would be to stand tomorrow soaking wet on the top of a mountain. So it would seem 
that, once information utility is defined in terms of objective gain instead of subject-
ive pleasure, considering it as synonymous of relevance is no longer problematic.3
However, here it is where our second objection kicks in, because there seems to be 
factors that affect information utility but not relevance – thus suggesting that the latter 
cannot be equated to the former, of which at most constitutes only one aspect. Con-
sider an information that is not only useful, but also indispensable for a goal G: that 
is, in the absence of that information, G cannot be achieved in any other way. An ex-
3 It is worth noting that this defense of utility-based relevance commits to consider all false  
information as irrelevant. While there are many who accept this claim, the matter is far from 
being settled, and proponents of an alethically neutral treatment of information and relev-
ance are not hard to find (e.g., Devlin 1991; Colburn 2000; Fetzer 2004). Severing relevance 
from utility allows us to take no stance on this ongoing debate.
ample of indispensable information would be the code of a safe, given the goal of 
“opening the safe”. Intuitively, the lack of alternatives makes indispensable informa-
tion very precious, all other things being equal – that is, it increases the utility of that 
information. But does indispensability affect also relevance? Apparently,  not at all. 
Imagine an alternative scenario,  where the safe can be opened using either one of 
1000 different codes. The information on each of these codes is clearly much less 
valuable than the information on the unique code in the original scenario, but the rel-
evance of it is exactly the same – high or low, depending on how important is the goal 
of “opening the safe”. In other words, while information utility seems to be affected 
by presence  or  absence  of  suitable  alternatives,  relevance  is  concerned  only with 
whether or not the information is pertinent to the agent's goal, regardless of how many 
other information (if any) would be equally pertinent. This asymmetry provides inde-
pendent reason to be skeptical of utility-based analysis of relevance, no matter how 
refined. Indeed, the definition of relevance provided in section 2 states that an inform-
ation is relevant if and only if it is needed at some step of goal-processing, but does 
not demand that such information fosters or advances in any way the achievement of 
that goal. As such, our notion of relevance is not to be equated with any notion of in-
formation utility.
4. Subjective and objective relevance: goals vs. interests
Relevance is without doubt subject-dependent, in that what is relevant for me can well 
be irrelevant for you, and vice versa. However, subject-dependent does not mean sub-
jective, and in fact it is possible (and, as we shall see, useful) to distinguish between 
subjective and objective relevance – both of which are subject-dependent. Subjective 
relevance refers to the agent's goals, that is, anticipatory representations of some state 
of affair that guide the agent's conduct. For an agent with the goal of “eating ham-
burgers”, the location of the nearest McDonald's is subjectively relevant. Objective 
relevance, instead, relates to the agent's  interests, that is, those states of affairs that, 
once realized, promote the agent's overall well-being, whether or not s/he was (or is) 
aware of this fact (Conte & Castelfranchi 1995). For an agent overly fond of McDon-
ald's, information on the nutritional properties of hamburgers are objectively relevant 
to the interest of promoting his/her health, whether or not s/he currently cares about it.
In well-adapted agents, goals tend to align with interests, either because they coin-
cide (an hungry agent has both the goal and the interest of eating) or because goals 
satisfy interests (the goal of having sex with beautiful partners generally satisfies the 
interest of reproduction with healthy conspecifics). However, it is neither impossible 
nor infrequent for agents to have goals that are not in their best interest, or even im-
pede it: some youngsters might purposefully spend all their energies in social drinking 
and online gaming, thus damaging their own interest in having a suitable education 
and a decent career ahead of them. When this happens, the agent might consider as 
subjectively irrelevant even information of the utmost (objective) relevance, due to 
the maladaptive configuration of his/her goals.  The youngsters  in question, for in-
stance, may honestly fail to see the relevance of their parents' tirade on the importance 
of doing homework and limiting Internet access.
More generally, even a generally well-behaved agent might temporarily fail to see 
what is best for him/her, or neglect to consider some alternative means available to an 
otherwise difficult or impossible end. In these cases, the agent's assessment of (sub-
jective) relevance is “mistaken”, more or less severely, not because s/he fails to com-
pute it in relation to goals, but because those goals are either wrong or incomplete,  
with respect to the agent's  objective interests. Imagine I have the goal of going to 
Rome and I am considering using either the train or the airplane; when I am told that  
“John will not use his car for the whole week”, I might consider this information irrel-
evant because I fail to see the connection with my current plans – namely, that I could 
borrow John's car and drive to Rome instead. But of course the information is (object-
ively) relevant, and always was, whether or not I end up realizing it. What made me 
err in assessing relevance was the lack of the instrumental sub-goal “driving to Rome” 
in my plan structure, that was too narrowly constrained to either trains or planes.
Notice that similar errors could well be fully justified, and even reasonable, if con-
sidered in light of our limited cognitive resources. In the example above, I might have 
had perfectly good reasons to limit my planning efforts to trains and planes: let us say  
for instance that I do not own a car, my friends who do usually cannot spare it for 
long periods of time, and renting a car or taking a cab to Rome would be too expens-
ive. Under such circumstances, excluding cars from my initial search for solutions is 
clearly a sensible policy, and ceases to be so only after being told of the (unexpected)  
availability of John's car. So there is nothing especially outrageous in the fact that I 
might at first fail to consider that information relevant for my plans, whereas I could 
be faulted as obdurate if I continue to ignore it once its relevance becomes apparent, 
e.g. because my friend patiently highlights the connection to me.4
Crucially, agents are in general well aware of their fallible nature, when it comes to 
assessing relevance. Thus they contemplate the possibility of error,  and sometimes 
even anticipate it. This is why, when faced with an apparently irrelevant information, 
we often try to “make sense of it” – that is, we assume it is relevant, and then try to 
justify this assumption in light of our goals and background knowledge. Here trust in 
relevance is again crucial: when the puzzling message comes from a source that we 
trust to deliver relevant information, we will be extremely thorough in searching for 
an explanation that will make the message relevant; on the contrary, if the source was 
suspected from the start to be incapable of providing relevant data, the irrelevant mes-
sage will just confirm this inability, and no “search for meaning” will ensue. More 
generally, the main reason why trust is required in handling relevance is precisely be-
cause we are not always the best judges of it, and we know it.
On the other hand, the distinction between subjective and objective relevance is 
also crucial from the standpoint of the information source: should the source take a 
“tutorial” attitude, that is, tailor its information to the objective interests of the recipi-
ent, or should it just efficiently answer explicit requests based on the recipient's goals? 
What if the source notices a discrepancy between the goals of the recipient (what s/he 
wants to know) and his/her interests (what s/he should know)? As mentioned, “over-
helping” sources address the recipient's interests as the real information needs, rather 
4 Due to length constraints, here we focus only on instances were relevance assessment is de-
fective: the agent does not consider as relevant something that actually is. But relevance as-
sessment can also be deceptive: agents may consider relevant something that actually is not.
than his/her goals. Designing automated over-helping sources is a crucial challenge 
for agreement technologies,  which also raises complex ethical issues (see Stock & 
Guerini in press).
5. Steps towards a formal model of trust in relevance
As discussed in section 2, a crucial problem in relevance assessment concerns how to 
establish exactly what pieces of information are concerned with (and thus relevant 
for) a given goal. This requires a principled mapping between goals and information, 
of the kind sketched in some of our previous work (most notably, Castelfranchi 1996, 
1997; Castelfranchi & Paglieri 2007), and whether or not such mapping will be easy 
to implement in any running system is still  an open issue. However,  this obstacle 
should not bar progress on other aspects of relevance dynamics. In particular, we do 
not need to wait upon a fully worked out model of relevance assessment, in order to  
model trust in the relevance of the source and feedback dynamics from information 
relevance to source assessment. 
Part of the reason why the time is ripe to introduce the topic of relevance in the 
study of trust is that much of what has been said for trust in general applies also to rel-
evance, mutatis mutandis. So it is possible, exerting some care, to take advantage of 
some off-the-shelf models of trust (for an authoritative review, see Ramchurn et al. 
2004) and “plug-in” relevance into them. In this section we will do just that, first ad -
opting Demolombe's conceptual treatment of trust in truth and completeness (for a re-
cent exposition, see Demolombe 2011) and extending it to trust in relevance, and later 
discussing instead how to expand the model of trust dynamics described by Villata 
and colleagues (2012) to account for relevance of sources, alongside with competence 
and sincerity. These two attempts are independent from each other, and are meant to 
exemplify two different directions to formalize and implement trust in relevance. The 
first strategy has the merit of offering a rich and nuanced picture of trust in informa-
tion sources and is viable for formalization in modal logic, although it does not lend 
itself to immediate implementation and might  have some limitations regarding the 
quantitative treatment of trust (but see Demolombe & Liau 2001; Lorini & Demo-
lombe 2008; Demolombe 2009 for possible solutions). The second approach, on the 
contrary, offers a quantitative treatment of source qualities and thus facilitate imple-
mentation in multi-agent systems, but it also raises issue of feedback distribution – 
that is, once a source is observed to behave better or worse than expected, how is this 
performance  to  be  diagnosed,  so  that  it  affects  differentially  each  feature  of  the 
source? Since pros and cons of these two lines of research complement each other, we 
believe they are both worthy of being simultaneously and independently pursued.
5.1 Varieties of trust in relevance
In a series of influential papers, Demolombe analyzed various types of trust, or, to be 
more precise, trust in various features of an information source. Below is a summary 
of such varieties, taken from a recent paper (Demolombe 2011, p. 15, our emphasis):
Trust in  sincerity: the truster believes that if he is informed by the trustee about 
some proposition, then the trustee believes that this proposition is true.
Trust in competence: the truster believes that if the trustee believes that some pro-
position is true, then this proposition is true.
Trust in  vigilance:  the truster believes that if some proposition is true,  then the 
trustee believes that this proposition is true.
Trust in cooperativity: the truster believes that if the trustee believes that some pro-
position is true, then he is informed by the trustee about this proposition.
Trust in  validity:  the truster believes that if he is informed by the trustee about 
some proposition, then this proposition is true.
Trust in completeness: the truster believes that if some proposition is true, then he 
is informed by the trustee about this proposition.
 
It is easy to see that validity and completeness can be derived, respectively, from 
sincerity and competence (validity), and from vigilance and cooperativity (complete-
ness), so we are inclined to disregard them as primitive features of the source. It is 
also evident that relevance is not included in this (fairly rich) picture of trust in in-
formation sources. This is perhaps not surprising, because Demolombe’s categories 
revolve around the notion of truth, whereas relevance concerns the link between in-
formation and goals. For the same reason, Demolombe’s truth-based concerns are or-
thogonal to those raised by considerations of relevance. Indeed, it is easy to generate 
the same four basic “varieties of trust”, only with respect to relevance, as follows (la-
bels in parentheses refer to the corresponding category for truth):
 
Trust in  pertinence (sincerity): the truster believes that if s/he is informed by the 
trustee about some proposition, then the trustee believes that this proposition is relev-
ant for him/her.
Trust  in  understanding (competence):  the truster believes  that  if  the trustee be-
lieves that some proposition is relevant for him/her, then this proposition is relevant  
for him/her.
Trust in knowledgeability (vigilance): the truster believes that if some proposition 
is relevant for him/her, then the trustee has some information about it.
Trust in sharing (cooperativity): the truster believes that if the trustee has informa-
tion about a relevant proposition, then s/he is informed by the trustee of it.
 
This shows that  (i)  the same four relationships identified by Demolombe apply 
equally well to truth and to relevance, and indeed (ii) the more comprehensive notion 
of source quality should incorporate also the satisfaction of relevance constraints – 
that is, a source is of high quality only if its information turns out to be both true and 
relevant (an expansion of Demolombe’s validity), and if it has access to enough true 
and relevant knowledge (an expansion of Demolombe’s completeness). More subtly, 
while correctness and relevance are both essential and yet independent constraints on 
source quality, completeness should be more properly re-defined in terms of relev-
ance.  Indeed,  the requirement of vigilance,  as formulated by Demolombe (if some 
proposition is true, then the trustee believes that this proposition is true), imposes un-
realistic demands on sources, and unnecessarily so. It is unlikely for any source, no 
matter how good it is, to be informed of all the facts of the world, and it is also largely 
useless, since the agent who is querying that source will not care about most of that  
information: what does matter, of course, is to be knowledgeable about what is relev-
ant for the agent. Similarly, Demolombe's requirement of cooperativity (if the trustee 
believes that some proposition is true, then the truster is informed by the trustee about 
this proposition) actually defines over-cooperation or, more exactly,  blind coopera-
tion: nobody would like to be flooded by irrelevant information from a source, only 
because that source happens to believe them. Once again, what matters is to be told 
about what the agent cares for, and only about that.
We believe  that  the  requirements  of  knowledgeability  and  sharing,  as  defined 
above, together suffice to capture a more sensible notion of completeness, insofar as 
“having information about something” is understood as incorporating the constraint 
that false information is no information at all (Grice 1989, p. 371).5 If this is correct, 
then we should only retain sincerity and competence from Demolombe's list, add our 
four relevance-based requirements,  and then re-define validity as a combination of 
sincerity,  competence, pertinence and understanding, and completeness as the com-
bination of  knowledgeability and sharing. Formalizing these notions in modal logic 
should then be fairly straightforward, following in Demolombe's footsteps, and this 
would provide a full-blown formal characterization of trust in information sources, in-
cluding trust in their relevance.
5.2 Relevance, trust and feedback dynamics
In a recent paper, Villata and colleagues (2012) focused on a rather unexplored aspect 
of trust dynamics: namely, how the quality of an information, once it has been veri-
fied, should impact on the assessment of its source (feedback dynamics). The issue 
had already been discussed theoretically by Falcone and Castelfranchi (2004), but this 
was the first attempt to provide a suitable formalization of it. The model by Villata  
and colleagues,  loosely based on the socio-cognitive theory of trust  elaborated by 
Castelfranchi  and Falcone (see  their  2010 for  a  detailed exposition),  distinguishes 
between competence and sincerity as relevant features of the source, and discusses 
how  to  integrate  them  to  generate  an  expectation  on  the  quality  of  information 
provided by the source, and how to differentially attribute praise (or blame) to each 
feature when that information turns out to be better (or worse) than expected.
There is no need to dwell on the technical details of their model, but it is worth not-
ing that (i) once again, relevance was not contemplated as a key dimension, for either 
information  or  source,  and  yet  (ii)  its  integration  seems  fairly  straightforward  to 
achieve. The first thing to note is that falsity and irrelevance are two different failures 
of information, and as such each of them will produce its own feedback on source as-
sessment. The second aspect worth emphasizing is that, also with respect to irrelev-
ance, it is possible to attribute this shortcoming either to lack of “competence” (in the  
sense of being unable to understand what the agent really needs) or to lack of honesty 
5 False information about X could still provide information about something else (typically, its 
source): when finance advisers were ensuring investors that sub-primes were a safe invest -
ment option, this did not convey any real information about sub-primes, but in hindsight 
speaks volume about the professional integrity of those advisers. None of this, however, 
changes the fact that false information about p does not provide any information on p.
(e.g., when the source deliberately misleads the agent, or withholds on purpose some 
vital information). So here we find the same problem described by Villata and collab-
orators in relation with truth and falsity of information: how to distribute the feedback 
between these two dimensions of source quality, i.e. competence and honesty. 
Since the kind of competence required to know the truth about the world is very 
different  from the  kind of  competence  needed  to divine  the agent's  informational 
needs, we believe a good model of information sources should keep these two aspects 
separate: a source could well be extremely good at understanding what others need to 
know, and yet poorly informed about such issues, or vice versa. In contrast, honesty 
(or sincerity, if one prefers that label) seems to be essentially the same feature, wheth-
er it applies to truth or relevance: an agent that deliberately lies, misleads, or omits 
important  information  is  still  manifesting the  same kind of  dishonest  attitude,  al-
though in different ways (different kinds of “deception”). Thus we propose to extend 
the model by Villata and colleagues as follows:
 consider  three  dimensions (instead  of  two) of  source  quality:  competence 
(whether the source knows the truth), understanding (whether the source un-
derstands what the agent needs), and honesty (whether the source tells what 
s/he believes to be both true and relevant for the agent);6
 consider two types of feedback, one related to truth, the other to relevance;
 distribute truth-based feedback between competence and honesty, and relev-
ance-based feedback between understanding and honesty.
Regarding  feedback determination (how much should source assessment change, 
given the observed quality of information), we agree with Villata and colleagues that 
this essentially depends on the mismatch between prior expectations and actual per-
formance of the source: if I expect a source to deliver information of a certain quality 
(positive or negative, it does not matter), the fact that I receive information of that ex-
act quality adds nothing to my knowledge of the source – it merely confirms my prior  
assessment (so, no feedback). Conversely, it is when I am surprised (delighted or dis-
appointed) by the quality of information provided from that source that I have reason 
to revise my assessment, and the greater my surprise, the larger the change in source  
consideration. We believe that this basic principle applies to the assessment of both 
truth-based and relevance-based feedback.7
6 Villata and colleagues index competence and sincerity (their label for honesty) to content 
domains. This is not completely satisfactory: domain-indexing works well for competence (a 
physician is competent about medicines and not about cars, whereas the opposite is true for  
a mechanic), but it is highly problematic for honesty, since the fact that a source may be de-
ceptive in some cases and not in others does not depend on semantic domains, but rather on 
personal  interests.  A suspicious  wife  will  believe  his  husband to  be  insincere  when  he 
protests his innocence, but she will have no doubt when he confesses his escapades – and 
yet the domain is exactly the same in both cases. So domain-indexing could be applied also  
to understanding (it is conceivable that a source is better attuned to my needs regarding  
some domain rather than others), but should not be adopted for honesty.
7 A further complication is that, as mentioned before,  sometimes our expectations about the  
source make us doubt our own assessment of the information: if a highly trusted source 
gives me an information that at first sight I judge to be false/irrelevant, I might very well  
have a second look and try to “make it” true/relevant through interpretative effort. Whether  
this is a perfectly sensible policy or a dangerous slippery slope towards wishful-thinking is 
The issue of feedback distribution (what portion of the overall feedback should im-
pact on each features of the source) is much more thorny, especially if one tries (as 
Villata and colleagues did) to deal with it using fairly limited expressive resources – 
in particular,  without giving the agent any causal  attribution theory on source per-
formance,  and without endowing agents with any representation of the beliefs and 
goals of the sources (Falcone & Castelfranchi 2004). When I realize there is some-
thing amiss with the information you provided me, I am usually able to figure out a  
plausible interpretation of what caused such dismal performance: some reasons might 
actually block feedback dynamics completely (e.g., you gave me wrong information 
on train schedule because you were not, and could not be, aware of the last-minute 
strike of railway personnel), while other reasons might indicate how to distribute it 
(e.g., whether or not I can attribute you some malicious intent or competing interest  
will be crucial to make me suspect you to be either dishonest or incompetent). Lack-
ing similar resources, one has to resort to rule-of-thumbs for feedback distribution, of 
the kind proposed by Villata and colleagues – and they acknowledge the limits of this 
approach, in spite of its merits (e.g., a relative simplicity in agent's architecture).
While it is not our aim to further deal with feedback dynamics, we would like in-
stead to conclude this section by pointing out that only relevance allows to analyze a 
special type of information failure: omissions. As mentioned before, in relation to De-
molombe's requirements of vigilance and cooperativity, a source cannot be faulted for 
not knowing all the facts in the world, or for not mentioning all the things s/he be-
lieves to be true. But when a source knows something that is  relevant for an agent, 
and yet fails to inform the agent of such fact, then we can accuse the source of omit-
ting something, due to a lack of understanding or honesty. In other words, an omis-
sion is not a failure to mention any true fact, but rather failure to communicate relev -
ant (and true) information. Without a proper analysis of relevance, omissions cannot 
be identified, because one cannot distinguish between the harmless (indeed, benefi-
cial) habit of passing under silence everything that does not matter, and the damaging 
policy of withholding valuable information, on purpose or by mistake (reticence).
6. Conclusions and future work
Our main aim in this paper was to put on the table a crucial and largely unexplored is-
sue in trust theory: so the emphasis was on presenting the problem in all its complex -
ity, rather than on finding suitable ways of solving it. Yet hopefully this first recogni-
tion will later prove instrumental to engender mature solutions, inasmuch as problem 
setting is an essential component of problem solving. In particular, we stressed that (i) 
relevance requires trust in information sources and is a key feature of their assess-
ment, on a par with competence; (ii) relevance is needed to properly constrain the 
definition of another key feature of sources, to wit, their completeness; (iii) relevance 
is based on goals, and a principled theory of the interaction between goals and beliefs  
essentially a matter of degree. However, it is worth noting that dealing with similar issues  
would complicate the simple mismatch-based rule of feedback determination adopted by 
Villata and colleagues (2012), and a Dempster-Shafer treatment of ignorance gaps might  
result helpful in that respect – intuitively, the more ignorance I have on my assessment of in-
formation quality, the more benefit of the doubt is reasonable to concede to trusted sources.
allows  assessing  relevance  without  resorting  to  convoluted,  counter-factual  ap-
proaches;  (iv) relevance contributes to the utility of information, yet  should not be 
identified with it; (v) relevance has both a subjective and an objective side, the former 
relative to goals, the latter to interests; (vi) several formal and computational models 
developed for trust in general are easily adapted to capture trust in relevance, and do-
ing so helps refining such models. More generally,  we hope that these preliminary 
considerations have shown that this relatively unexplored line of research has much 
potential for the theory and technologies of trust, thus providing some encouragement 
for others to trod the same path further and more systematically.
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